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Chapter  10
INTRODUCTION
Today social networking sites are ubiquitous and 
inseparable from the digital world. They host 
an important part of the online communication 
and contain the majority of people’s personal 
information that is available on the World Wide 
Web. The monetary worth of this huge amount of 
information is ever increasing, resulting in mind-
blowing market values.
Ever since Facebook launched their applica-
tion development environment, social application 
platforms – together with their applications itself 
- are ubiquitous in the context of social network-
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ABSTRACT
An important recent innovation on social networking sites is the support for plugging in third-party 
social applications. Together with the ever-growing number of social network users, social applications 
come with privacy and security risks for those users. While basic mechanisms for isolating applications 
are well understood, these mechanisms fall short for social-enabled applications. It is an interesting 
challenge to design and develop application platforms for social networks that enable the necessary 
functionality of social applications without compromising both users’ security and privacy. This chapter 
will identify and discuss the current security and privacy problems related to social applications and 
their platforms. Next, it will zoom in on proposals on how to address those problems.
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ing sites. Almost every major social networking 
site nowadays provides means to consult personal 
user data from their social graph. Third-party 
social applications spread through the online 
communities and the popularity of these social 
applications keeps increasing. Support for such 
third-party applications is an important contribu-
tor to the overall success of social network sites 
(Pham, 2011).
Typical for these social-aware applications, is 
that the code provider typically is a third stake-
holder, different from the social network site and 
the end user. Because an application has access 
to social data, also the application provider itself 
gets access. Given the growing amount of privacy-
sensitive social data on social network sites, this 
becomes more and more an undesirable situation.
In this chapter we will focus on these privacy 
and security problems in the context of online 
social network applications. In this context, third-
party application are typically developed in client-
side scripting languages like JavaScript – which 
will be executed in the user’s browser - often in 
combination with server-side technologies like 
PHP or Java – fueling the back-end part of the 
application.
The first objective of this chapter is to introduce 
the details -– both the architectural and technologi-
cal - of the previous and current social application 
platforms. The second objective is to identify 
three different categories based on these security/
privacy related problems. The third objective is 
to examine what recent scientific literature tries 
to do in order to address those problems.
BACKGROUND
According to Facebook, people install such ap-
plications more than 20 million times per day, day 
after day (Facebook, 2011). However, the use of 
such applications comes with privacy and security 
risk for the social network users.
Trusting Facebook, Google, and other big 
social network providers to respect your privacy, 
is hard to avoid when using social networking 
sites. Trusting each third-party application de-
veloper to respect the policies, imposed by the 
social network providers and to respect the user’s 
privacy, is less justified.
An investigation conducted by the Wall Street 
Journal, published October 18, 2010, claimed 
that nearly every popular Facebook application 
was leaking – in some way or another – privacy-
sensitive information to other parties, such as 
Internet tracking companies and advertising 
companies (Steel & Fowler, 2010).
The basic isolation mechanisms for applica-
tions fall short for social-enabled applications: they 
need more fine-grained control both of the access 
that these applications have to information, as well 
as how this information is used after access has 
been granted. There have been various reported 
incidents of information leakages by social appli-
cations. Mills (2008) report on some applications 
allowing to peak into the social graph because 
they are vulnerable for a peephole vulnerability 
that allowed anyone to view private information. 
Other applications unintentionally leak private 
social data – while some even do this on purpose 
(Steel & Fowler, 2010; Kelly, 2008).
Hence, it is an interesting software engineering 
challenge to design an application platform for 
social networks that enables the rich functionality 
of social applications, but mitigates both security 
and privacy risks as much as possible.
SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF 
ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK 
APPLICATION PLATFORMS
This section will cover two main implementation 
models for social network application platforms. 
Next it will dig into the different security and 
privacy issues resulting from the design choices 
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made in each implementation model. Finally, it will 
survey three proposals for more privacy-enhanced 
social application platforms.
Implementation Models
There exist roughly two different architectures for 
the implementation of social web applications. 
The earliest implementation model supports de-
ployment of applications on the social network 
site infrastructure itself. In this so-called gadget 
paradigm, the application is described in an XML 
specification and embedded within the social 
network site infrastructure. This XML file will 
be loaded, converted and displayed in the context 
of the social network site in order to deploy the 
application. In this paradigm, the social network 
site has total control over the application’s code 
and inserts the social data where needed. The 
social network site plugs the augmented code of 
the application in its own code. This approach 
allows the social network site to exercise a rea-
sonable level of control over the application, as 
it can freely modify the code.
The growing trend amongst current social 
network sites, however, is to roll out a different 
approach: the social network site offers an API 
to query its data over HTTP. Using protocols 
such as OAuth, a user can delegate access to his 
social data to an application provider. The social 
application can then query the social network API 
over HTTP. As a consequence of this so-called 
distributed paradigm, social applications no longer 
have to be integrated in the social network site 
infrastructure itself.
The benefit for application providers is twofold. 
First, developers are no longer restricted to the 
site-specific technologies offered by the social 
network site. Second, the provider has complete 
control over its application code. One of the ben-
efits of this paradigm shift for the social network 
site is the removal of the complex conversion 
process for the XML specifications. However, 
this second model comes with additional security 
and privacy risks.
In this section of the chapter, we will describe 
the two main architectures for supporting social 
applications in more detail, as it is the crucial 
stepping-stone to identify the security and pri-
vacy threats.
Gadget Approach
Facebook launched their application development 
platform on May 24, 2007. In the months after 
the release, Facebook introduced the Facebook 
Markup Language (FBML) and Facebook JavaS-
cript (FBJS). FBML is an extension of HTML 
and provides special tags to extract user-specific 
data from the social graph. A tag like <fb:name 
uid=”12345”/> can be used to extract the name of 
the user with id 12345 from the social graph and 
embed it within the HTML page rendered in the 
browser. FBJS is a limited, safe subset of standard 
JavaScript. Facebook can rewrite this subset of 
JavaScript in such a way that it is safe to embed the 
application directly into the wrapping Facebook 
page, without the risk of the wrapping page being 
compromised by the application’s JavaScript e.g., 
by leaking private information embedded within 
the page. With these two programming tools in 
hand, developers could start to design third-party 
applications for Facebook.
In this setting, applications are in fact simple 
documents – containing both FBML and FBJS – 
that have to be transmitted to Facebook in order 
to become a real social application. When a user 
wants to use an application, she browses to the 
application page inside Facebook. Facebook will 
then translate the FBML tags of the application 
and convert the FBJS to regular JavaScript. The 
result is a combination of regular HTML and 
JavaScript that is embedded in the corresponding 
Facebook page. Figure 1 illustrates the working of 
the original FBML/FBJS approach of Facebook 
applications.
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Recently, Facebook decided to change the 
strategy behind their application platform (Beard, 
2010). They chose to shift their focus from the 
rather static FBML/FBJS to a more distributed 
approach, in order to give developers the oppor-
tunity to create more dynamic applications using 
regular JavaScript and HTML instead of FBJS 
and FBML. In April 2010, Facebook launched 
their Graph API, a RESTful API to extract data 
from the social graph. The strategy behind this 
RESTful concept is that it works with simple 
HTTP requests towards the Facebook servers, 
based on a unique social-entity-id. Facebook re-
sponds with the desired information in the acces-
sible JSON1 format.
This new strategy allows application develop-
ers to design applications that are less interleaved 
with the Facebook platform internals. Applications 
can get the desired social information directly from 
the server. Thus, Facebook is no longer needed 
as a proxy between the application server and the 
user, injecting the social context into the applica-
tion page on the fly.
In a more distributed approach, the applica-
tion is typically hosted on a server under its own 
domain name. When the application is accessed as 
a page in the context of Facebook, this domain is 
loaded inside an iframe in the Facebook page. This 
separates the DOM of the wrapping Facebook page 
from the DOM of the application page, providing 
enough protection for the sensitive Facebook data.
Together with the introduction of the distrib-
uted approach, Facebook made its authorization 
policy more fine-grained. In the early days, users 
had only two privacy options for applications: 
allow the application to access all personal data, 
or deny it to use any data. Since April 2010, 
applications have to ask different kinds of per-
missions from the user, to access different kinds 
of information. This approach provides more 
transparency, and allows the user to make a better, 
well-consistent decision.
Figure 1. Architectural overview of the gadget approach using FBML and FBJS
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Unlike Facebook, other important social net-
working sites, such as Google, MySpace, Yahoo 
and Netlog, united their efforts to provide a uni-
form interoperable social application platform. 
The specifications of this platform were called 
OpenSocial and were launched in November 
2007. At first sight, the OpenSocial standards are 
a promising competitor for the aforementioned 
Facebook platform.
An OpenSocial platform is quite similar to the 
Facebook platform as it also supports two different 
strategies to develop applications interacting with a 
social network, although less separated than those 
of the Facebook platform. The first strategy is a 
rather static approach in which the application is 
provided in an XML file as illustrated in Figure 
2. This is called the gadget setting of an applica-
tion. The XML file is converted and embedded in 
a wrapping page from the social networking site, 
similar to Facebook’s FBML/FBJS approach. In 
this setting, applications can make calls to the 
wrapping social network using a JavaScript API. 
This strategy of directly embedding applications 
in a wrapping social networking site page poses 
the same security problems as in the Facebook 
platform. For this reason, the OpenSocial gadget 
strategy is often combined with the use of Caja 
(Capabilities JavaScript)2, which is used in the 
same way as FBJS on the Facebook Platform.
As a second strategy, OpenSocial also provides 
a RESTful API to communicate with the social 
networking site. Under this model, applications 
operate under a separate domain or are contained 
in an iframe inside the social networking site. It 
is completely similar to the working of Facebook’s 
Graph API in combination with the iframe setting.
Gadgets are the oldest form of embedded 
third-party applications in websites. As Facebook 
is deprecating the gadget approach, our focus 
will be more on the OpenSocial specification of 
gadgets. The general idea behind this approach 
is not complex. The application developer makes 
his application available somewhere online in a 
document version. Figure 2 shows how this is 
typically done using the XML format. In this 
document, the application developer provides a 
set of preferences and meta-information on how to 
run the application. As we can expect, the largest 
part of the document consists of the application’s 
HTML (or FBML) and limited JavaScript.
The social networking site transforms this 
document later on into an application that is em-
bedded inside the wrapping page.
Now imagine that we want to add some 
social context to our application. We could, as 
an example, change the code in Figure 2 from 
a simple gadget into a simple social gadget, by 
making the greeting personal. The corresponding 
Figure 2. XML specification of a basic OpenSocial gadget
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XML file in Figure 3 shows that it is enough to 
use JavaScript code to request the nickname of 
the current viewer. The JavaScript API provides 
much more social data requests besides the one 
illustrated in the example. The OpenSocial JS 
API supports also these JavaScript API calls. All 
OpenSocial implementing partners are supposed to 
implement the OpenSocial APIs. Hence the XML 
specification of the very basic social application 
in Figure 3 is portable across all OpenSocial sup-
porting platforms. A developer can specify one 
application in the OpenSocial XML format, post 
it somewhere online and point to it from different 
OpenSocial supporting social networking sites.
It is important to notice that in the gadget set-
ting, there is no need for user authentication: 
because the user is already logged in with the 
social networking site and the application is run-
ning directly inside the page of the same social 
networking site, the user’s identity and informa-
tion can easily be transmitted to the application, 
without the need of extra user-authentication. It 
is the responsibility of the social networking site 
to ask the user to explicitly allow the application 
to access her personal data.
Distributed Approach
The distributed approach is a newer strategy to 
provide the necessary framework for third-party 
applications. In this approach, the developer hosts 
the application under its own domain name. 
Whenever the application is accessed inside the 
context of the social networking site, it is simply 
loaded into an iframe inside that social network-
ing site and its way of operation doesn’t change 
a bit. To support the social setting of this kind of 
applications that have no direct connection with 
the social networking site, the platform typically 
provides REST APIs. These APIs provide a HTTP 
interface to access social data. The REST-requests 
can be issued from the application server, from 
a browser or from anywhere else. Facebook and 
OpenSocial call their REST API, respectively, 
Graph API and OpenSocial REST API.
In contrast to the gadget approach in which no 
explicit authentication and authorization from the 
user are needed because the application runs inside 
the social networking site, the distributed approach 
requires an authentication procedure. Both Face-
book and OpenSocial use the OAuth2.0 protocol 
to authenticate a user. This procedure allows a 
Figure 3. XML specification of an OpenSocial Gadget
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user to give the application access to her private 
data without having to hand out her credentials. 
Facebook adds a fine-grained permission model 
on top of the basic user authentication. We give 
the authentication and authorization procedure 
for the Facebook platform.
• The user loads the homepage of the appli-
cation in his browser either directly under 
its domain name or inside an iframe in the 
context of the social networking site.
• The starting page of the application contains 
JavaScript code to guide the user through 
the authentication and authorization proce-
dure with the social networking site. This 
can be done by automatically redirecting 
the user’s browser to a URL like https://
www.facebook.com/dialog/oauth?client_
id=YOUR_APP_ID&redirect_ur i= 
YOUR_URL&scope=email,fr iends_
likes&response_type=token.
• If the user is not yet logged in to Facebook, 
he logs in.
• Then he grants the requested access rights 
to the application.
• Facebook generates an access token for 
this user and this application, appends 
this token to the redirect_url and redi-
rects the browser back to the application 
YOUR_URL#accesstoken.
• The application server saves the access to-
ken, and redirects the browser to the start-
ing page of the application.
With this access token the application can 
start to issue the requests for social data to the 
social application platform. After successfully 
finishing the OAuth2.0 procedure, the following 
request, GET https://graph.facebook.com/me/
email?&access_token=accesstoken will return 
the e-mail address of the user who did the autho-
rization procedure. The OpenSocial procedure 
is similar, apart from a far more coarse-grained 
permission model. In Facebook there are many 
different permissions, providing the user with a 
certain transparency. OpenSocial only provides 
one specific permission: allow or deny the ap-
plication to access all of your data.
Issuing these REST-requests with JavaScript 
from within the browser, poses a problem con-
cerning the Same-Origin Policy of the browser. A 
certain origin – a triplet consisting of domain name, 
port, and protocol – is not allowed to access data 
from another origin. For example, the application 
running under the domain www.yourapplication.
com will not be allowed to directly access data 
coming from www.socialnetworkingsite.com. The 
use of JSONP3, a standard technique to circumvent 
the Same Origin Policy in many situations, solves 
this problem.
Security and Privacy Issues
The current state of the art design of social applica-
tion platforms raises several risks concerning the 
user’s privacy-sensitive information when using 
third-party applications. This section addresses 
some of the most important issues concerning 
these privacy risks, both on architectural and on 
implementation level. As the distributed approach 
gains popularity and even seems to replace the 
gadget approach, we mainly focus on the distrib-
uted approach for the rest of this chapter.
Due to the growing popularity of social ap-
plication platforms and the growing support for 
APIs to access social data, addressing the secu-
rity issues of exposing social data to third party 
applications becomes important. A key problem 
is the total loss of control by the social network 
site whenever sensitive information reaches the 
application provider. Once a social application 
obtains sensitive information, it is impossible for 
the social network site to revoke access to infor-
mation or to enforce any restrictions on where the 
information can or may flow to. As evidenced by 
Steel & Fowler (2010), Mills (2008), and Spencer 
(2008), this problem has become a real-world 
threat for social application users.
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In this section of the chapter we will illustrate 
these security issues present in the two common 
implementation models for social applications 
discussed in the previous section.
Privacy Protection Policy
In the original privacy policy of almost all social 
networking sites, an application has the same 
view of the social network as its users. Under the 
pressure of the public opinion, some big social 
networking sites like Facebook and Google+ were 
forced to improve their original privacy policy. 
Nowadays, social networking sites tend to ask the 
user to agree with giving the application permis-
sion to access her data and put the responsibility 
of privacy protection in the hands of the end user. 
This strategy legally protects the social networking 
sites, as the user explicitly shares her data with the 
application. However, it can be hard for users to 
make a well-considered decision, especially since 
there is a lot of social pressure involved with using 
social applications.
It is important to note that OpenSocial still 
doesn’t work with a fine-grained permission 
model, neither for their gadget approach nor their 
distributed approach, but implementers could 
always decide to enhance this model within their 
implementation.
Leaking of Social Data
The first important consequence of the current 
architecture of social network platforms is the 
fact that once the sensitive data has reached the 
application server, neither the user nor the social 
networking site can control the flow of the data 
anymore (see Figure 4). This is because of the 
fact that the application itself is running on serv-
ers out-of-control of the social networking site. 
The application providers have total control of 
all incoming information – received because the 
application’s user allowed it. Although the ap-
plication developer is legally prohibited to pass 
the sensitive data to third parties, there are cur-
rently no technically mechanisms to enforce this 
Figure 4. Distributed social application platform design
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partly because the source code of the application 
is mainly invisible for the end-user.
A Wall Street Journal investigation claimed 
that nearly every popular Facebook application 
leaked, in some way or another, sensitive private 
information to other parties, such as Internet 
tracking companies and advertising companies 
(Steel & Fowler, 2010). This transfer of personal 
information happened without the knowledge of 
the users. Of course, the companies behind the 
applications were quick to minimize the impact. 
They promised to fix the bug that caused the 
privacy breaches and after a short time of quar-
antine their applications were still running.
The article showed that most application de-
velopers do not hesitate to make money by selling 
the private information of their users. The article 
also showed that it is extremely difficult to verify 
whether every application sticks to the privacy 
policies - let alone to legally pursue the developers 
behind it in case of fraudulent behavior. Finally, 
it also showed that social networking sites and 
country laws imposing rules and policies upon 
third-parties are a good way to protect the privacy 
when there are adequate control mechanisms to 
verify their compliance with those rules, which is 
definitely not the case for the current architecture.
Issues with Access Tokens
In the current distributed design of social applica-
tion platforms, access tokens play an important 
role in protecting the user’s privacy. With a valid 
access token, any third-party can authenticate a 
request. It can even spoof that a request was allowed 
from a specific user. A crucial factor in the use of 
these access tokens appears to be their lifetime.
Facebook Access Tokens
As described earlier, a Facebook access token 
is the result of a successful OAuth2.0 user au-
thentication process. Facebook keeps an access 
token valid for about 60 minutes. After they 
expire, the application has to redirect the user 
back to the OAuth2.0 authentication procedure to 
renew the access token. For convenience, Face-
book remembers that the user already granted a 
certain set of permissions to the application and 
the user’s permission is given implicitly when 
authenticating. Facebook remembers this set of 
granted permissions as long as the application is 
present in the set of applications in the profile 
of the user. Thus, only when a user runs an ap-
plication for the first time (or after she removed 
the application from her applications list), she is 
required to grant explicitly her permissions; all 
consecutive times, Facebook will implicitly grant 
the same permissions.
In order to protect the privacy of Facebook’s 
users, RESTful data requests are only answered 
when the user is – at the same time of the request 
– logged in to Facebook. Obviously, Facebook 
also requires the user to be logged in during any 
explicit or implicit authentication procedure. So 
in theory, an application has access to the user’s 
data during the time that the user is logged in to 
Facebook and until at most one hour after she 
stopped using the application. After that time, 
the application would need to renew the access 
token, however to obtain this token it would have 
to redirect the browser of the user back to the 
OAuth2.0 endpoint of the Facebook platform, and 
this is not possible. Because the user has stopped 
running the application, code is no longer present 
in the browser and the application has no longer 
the possibility of redirecting the user.
Strangely, Facebook offers one violation of 
this principle. Let us recall the scope parameter 
in the example of the Facebook OAuth2.0 pro-
cedure. When an application developer puts the 
offline_access permission in scope and the user 
grants this permission, the access token doesn’t 
expire and the data can be accessed even when the 
user is not logged in to Facebook. This means that 
her data is accessible for the application provider, 
any time from now on until she actively removes 
the application from her profile page.
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OpenSocial Access Tokens
An OpenSocial access token, by default, doesn’t 
come with an expiration date. It is up to the 
implementing OpenSocial container to manage 
the validity of access tokens. However, Open-
Social standards provide a way to refresh the 
access token. The application simply has to send 
the longer-life refresh token that comes together 
with an access token. The container will respond 
with a new short-life access token.
OpenSocial’s mechanisms to protect the pri-
vacy of users are much weaker. The OpenSocial 
framework doesn’t provide any granularity for the 
permissions included in its access token. It is up 
to the implementing containers to manage differ-
ent granularities of permissions. In practice this 
means that OpenSocial applications often have 
access to the same kind of data that the user has 
access to. This contains the user’s private data and 
all the data that other people share with the user.
In contrast to the Facebook platform, where 
a user always has to go through an explicit or 
implicit OAuth2.0 procedure before the applica-
tion acquires an access token, OpenSocial has an 
alternative built in to circumvent this OAuth2.0 
procedure. OpenSocial provides code for get-
ting the security token from inside the gadget 
setting without any user interaction. This means 
that an OpenSocial gadget can obtain an access 
token, even without directing a user through the 
OAuth2.0 procedure. This can be dangerous be-
cause the access token provides the opportunity 
to access all private information of the user, as 
we discussed before. First of all, the user doesn’t 
know that she provided the gadget with an access 
token that gives access to her complete profile. 
On top of that, there isn’t a proper mechanism to 
revoke the access that is given to the third parties 
holding this access token.
There can be another privacy problem in an 
OpenSocial implementation: let’s assume that an 
access token has a lifetime of 20 minutes after the 
last time it was used. This means that by generating 
dummy requests every 15 minutes an application 
developer can keep this token valid for eternity. 
This makes things worse – in contrast to the 
Facebook platform – because a user doesn’t have 
to be online to get the answer to a REST-request 
from the OpenSocial platform. Finally wrapping 
everything together, this means that once you 
played a game, the application developer behind 
this game possibly has an access token that pro-
vides access to all of your social data. The access 
token can be used indefinitely and there is no clear 
way to revoke it.
Conclusion
We can conclude that the current design of social 
application platforms is far from privacy friendly. 
Personal sensitive information can leak away 
through third-party applications without the user 
knowing when and to whom this information is 
sent. On top of that it is not always very clear how 
to revoke the access rights once granted to third-
party applications. The situation is even worse for 
static data like an e-mail address. Once the user 
granted permission to an application to read her 
e-mail address, there is nothing the user or her 
favorite social networking site can do to restrict 
its further spreading over the Internet.
As opposed to Facebook – that performed some 
updates of its platform under pressure of its users 
to provide a certain legally justified user privacy 
towards third-party applications – OpenSocial 
has not yet included these privacy improvements 
in their design.
Privacy-Enhanced Social 
Application Platforms
Although the subject is on the verge of scientific 
study, there are already some suggestions for 
privacy-enhanced social application platforms in 
the academic literature. This last section summa-
rizes these different strategies that partially solve 
the privacy issues discussed above.
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This section will survey and compare three 
different approaches. A first approach was to 
anonymize social data before handing it over to 
the application provider. Another idea was to apply 
concepts from information flow analysis on social 
applications to contain and regulate information 
flowing in and out of the application. The third we 
will discuss is a countermeasure to prevent access 
tokens from ever leaving the browser.
Privacy-by-Proxy
Already in the early days of the integration of 
third-party applications with social networking 
sites, Felt and Evans (2008) uncovered the pri-
vacy problems concerning these applications and 
came up with a solution. As their work already 
got published in 2008, they based their research 
on the first Facebook approach, the FBML/FBJS 
strategy. Although the limitation of their solution 
to the gadget approach is currently outdated, it 
was justified in 2008 and is therefore worth to 
be studied. Being the first to address privacy 
problems with social application platforms, they 
did pioneering work both in studying the state of 
the art in those days and in proposing a solution 
for the problem. They focused in their work on 
the Facebook approach, although they argued 
that it would also work in the OpenSocial gadget 
approach.
Felt and Evans (2008) propose an implemen-
tation for a privacy-enhanced social application 
platform based on what they call privacy-by-proxy. 
In the gadget approach, the social networking site 
always hosts the application inside its own page, 
and it performs a translation from FBML and 
FBJS to regular HTML and JavaScript. Hence the 
social networking site acts as a proxy between the 
application’s code and the visualization towards 
the user.
Felt and Evans (2008) propose to encrypt 
user ids in order to anonymize the contents of the 
social graph. The applications are only allowed 
to work with this anonymized data. They also 
extend the markup language to include tags that 
allow working with these anonymized ids. For 
example, <uval id=”[$id]” field=”birthday” /> 
would put the birthday of the user on the screen, 
based on her anonymized id. Upon the request for 
the friends of a certain user, an application gets a 
list of anonymized ids. This way an application 
can only work with an anonymized social graph. 
It is very important that de-anonymized data 
doesn’t return to the application server. Because 
their solution works in the gadget approach, 
the social networking site has the possibility to 
statically check – i.e., before it has the chance to 
get executed – whether the contained JavaScript 
(FBJS) doesn’t leak any data.
This implementation needs one more element 
to make it completely secure. There has to be a 
limitation in the set of tags that are translated in 
the application of a certain user. It is necessary to 
de-anonymize the birthday of a friend. However, 
the social networking site should not de-anonymize 
the birthday of a stranger, because in that case an 
evil application developer could install its own 
application and create an extra page in which he 
exhaustively de-anonymizes his whole database. 
Felt and Evans (2008) solve this problem by only 
de-anonymizing data from users that appear on 
a certain contact list. This list summarizes all 
people with whom the user has had some sort of 
interaction.
Felt and Evans (2008) tested their implemen-
tation, and only a small minority of the popular 
Facebook applications of those days would stop 
working. This proved that the approach was both 
secure and maintained the important functional-
ity of third-party applications. However, since 
Facebook and OpenSocial introduced their dis-
tributed approach, the social networking site lost 
its role as proxy between the application and the 
user. Hence it can no longer translate the tags in 
a privacy concise way or prevent the private data 
from being leaked to the application server, as 
the application server can request personal data 
directly.
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xBook
Singh, Bhola, and Lee (2009) came up with a 
different, more complex solution addressing the 
privacy issues concerning social third-party ap-
plications – called xBook. It is an architectural 
framework that combines a social networking site 
with untrusted third-party applications. It provides 
a container in which the third-party applications 
are deployed. That way the xBook framework can 
monitor and regulate all information streams that 
pass through the third-party application.
As xBook is a complete architecture that 
contains both the client side and server side 
implementation of the third-party applications, 
it has the possibility to impose strong regulation 
mechanisms. In order to do this, third-party ap-
plications are split up into different components. 
The subdivision of the components is based on 
their interaction with third parties and handling 
of private data. For example: one client side com-
ponent renders the application’s pages in the web 
browser together with the privacy sensitive data; 
while another client side component is in charge 
of communicating with a third-party server. In 
this setting the second component doesn’t have 
access to the private information contained in the 
first component. The only way that components 
can send data to each other is by using xBook as 
a mediator.
Upon installation of the application, a manifest 
is presented to the user stating which data will 
be accessed and shared with which third parties. 
During operation, xBook verifies that the different 
components – forming the application – keep to 
the policy. This strategy gives xBook a powerful 
mechanism to regulate information streams and 
make data transfers explicit to the user. The same 
ideas are implemented for the server side compo-
nents as well. xBook mediates all inter-component 
communication and because each component has 
its own responsibility, it knows where and how 
private data leaks out of the system.
xBook works in a very rigid way: it addresses 
all the privacy related issues, discussed in the 
first part of this chapter. However, the framework 
comes with some disadvantages. First of all, it is a 
complex system. It has to statically or dynamically 
check whether the components behave like they 
are assumed to behave. For example, a compo-
nent that has access to private information cannot 
make calls to third-party servers. This strategy 
involves the use of JavaScript libraries like Caja 
or alike for the client side components, and stati-
cally checking its compliance. It also requires a 
server side labeling method to prevent that data 
leaks unnoticed out of the framework. On top 
of all these control mechanisms the application 
server components also run inside of the social 
networking site’s framework, consuming server 
resources. Finally, even when a social networking 
site decides to provide the servers and implement 
all the control mechanisms, it is very unlikely that 
third-party applications will be happy to provide 
all their code, even that of the server side, to the 
social network.
We can conclude that xBook is a theoretically 
excellent solution for the privacy issues addressed 
in this chapter. However, disadvantages of xBook 
are its complexity and possibly the unwillingness 
of third-party developers to make applications for 
the framework.
PoX
The third example of a privacy-enhanced social 
application platform that can be found in the lit-
erature is called PoX (Egele, Moser, Kruegel, & 
Kirda, 2011). It is based on a client-side-proxy idea. 
The design focuses on providing a privacy-secure 
environment when using the applications in the 
distributed approach. The fact that applications 
can request privacy-sensitive information from 
the social networking site without the users even 
being aware of it, poses a major privacy issue in 
the distributed setting. The third-party application 
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only needs the right access token to get access to 
the desired information.
PoX introduces a client-side-proxy that miti-
gates this kind of unnoticed data exchanges by 
preventing that the access token ever leaves the 
browser. Without this access token, no third-party 
can get private data from the social networking 
site; hence all data exchanges have to pass through 
the client-side-proxy in the browser. Applications 
have to request data to the client-side-proxy in the 
browser of the user. Based on policies – set by 
the client in an access control list (ACL) – PoX 
decides whether to forward the request to the 
social networking site and send the data back to 
the application server or whether it ignores the 
request. In this design the user herself can monitor 
and regulate which personal data are transmitted 
to third-party applications and which data have 
to remain confident.
In detail, PoX consists of (1) a plug-in for 
the browser that filters the access token from the 
HTTP stream and (2) some code running inside 
a hidden iframe in the browser. This code uses a 
technique known as ‘long polling’ to configure 
the server-to-client communication. When the 
application is loaded, the PoX code that resides 
in the browser makes an HTTP request to the ap-
plication server and tries to fetch a kind of dynamic 
webpage. As long as the application doesn’t need 
information, it stalls the response to this request. 
Once it needs extra personal information, the 
server generates a response containing the data 
request. The PoX code decides whether it should 
forward the request. If yes, it forwards the social 
networking site’s answer to the request and the 
system goes back into the stalling modus.
In contrast to xBook, PoX is a very lightweight 
privacy protection mechanism. Despite this rela-
tively simple design it reaches a lot of its goals. 
With PoX, a user can manage her privacy settings 
according to her own wishes, and enforce on her 
own that those wishes are respected. However, both 
xBook and PoX suffer from the same problem, 
as the user can still be misled by a third-party 
application. Imagine for example the case in 
which a user makes a mistake and trusts an evil 
third-party application, and she grants access to 
her personal data. In both designs the third-party 
application can send this sensitive data to another 
third-party server out of the control boundary of 
xBook and PoX. Because of this one-time mistake, 
the user has lost her information and has no way 
of revoking the access rights of that information.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The three examples found in literature and de-
scribed earlier, each provide a different interesting 
point of view on the subject. However, none of 
them completely solves the earlier listed issues. 
The approach of Felt and Evans (2008) shows 
some interesting aspects of anonymization, but 
unfortunately the social application platforms have 
evolved a lot since the publication: the solution 
doesn’t work anymore for the distributed approach. 
Both xBook and PoX map better on the current 
state-of-the-art social application platforms, but 
they do not prevent that social data leaks away to 
servers beyond the control of the user or the social 
networking site. These findings suggest that there 
is no privacy enhanced social application platform 
that maps on the current state of the art and still 
prevents sensitive data to leak away.
In the distributed approach to social applica-
tion platforms, maintaining privacy guarantees is 
essentially an information flow problem (Sabelfeld 
& Myers, 2003). Third party code gets access to 
sensitive information and should be prevented from 
leaking that information to inappropriate channels.
Fortunately, the information flow security 
community has made significant steps forward 
over the past decade. In particular, several static 
and dynamic approaches to enforce information 
flow security in JavaScript-like languages have 
been proposed (Hedin & Sabelfeld, 2012; Hedin & 
Sabelfeld, 2012; Austin & Flanagan, 2012; Chugh, 
Meister, Jhala, & Lerner, 2009; Bielova, Devriese, 
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Massaci, & Piessens, 2011; Devriese & Piessens, 
2010). Hence, we believe that a promising avenue 
for future work is the application of these enforce-
ment mechanisms to social applications.
CONCLUSION
The two largest social application platforms – the 
Facebook platform and the OpenSocial stan-
dards – both support the distributed approach 
to integrate third-party applications within their 
framework. The OpenSocial gadget approach 
poses some serious security and privacy risks, so 
it is questionable whether it will be around for a 
long time. A support for this claim can be found 
in the deprecation of Facebook’s gadget approach 
in January 2012.
Apart from the privacy violations identified 
in the OpenSocial gadget approach, these social 
application platforms are far from being privacy-
friendly. Third-party applications typically have far 
more access to the user’s social data than strictly 
needed to function, effectively violating the prin-
ciple of least-privilege and posing privacy threats.
Several privacy-enhanced social application 
platforms are developed, but none of them seems 
to completely solve the issues for the most com-
mon distributed approach. A promising future 
direction is to develop such a privacy-enhanced 
platform using novel enforcement mechanisms 
recently developed in the information flow secu-
rity community.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Application Provider: The stakeholder that 
provides the software of an application, as opposed 
to other stakeholders such as the end-users of the 
software or the owner of the infrastructure that 
runs the software.
Gadget: In the context of this chapter, a gadget 
is a piece of software that runs in the context of an 
online social network, and is hosted on the online 
social network infrastructure.
Information Flow Analysis: The analysis of 
how inputs to a program influence the outputs of 
that program, in order to put bounds on the infor-
mation that can be deduced about private inputs 
by observers that can only observe public outputs.
JavaScript: A prototype-based dynamic 
scripting language originally developed by 
Netscape to support scripting of their web browser. 
JavaScript was later standardized as ECMAScript, 
and all major web browsers today support a vari-
ant of the language.
Online: Social Network (OSN): An online 
platform where users can publish public or semi-
public profile information, form relationships with 
other users, and interact in a variety of ways with 
these relations and with the general public.
Representational State Transfer (REST): 
An architectural style for distributed software 
systems that emphasizes uniform, stateless and 
cacheable software interfaces.
Social Application: In the context of this chap-
ter, a social application is a third-party provided 
software application that runs in the context of, 
or in interaction with an online social network, 
and that makes use of the profile and relationship 
information that is present in that online social 
network.
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ENDNOTES
1  JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) is a 
textual representation – based on open 
standards – of JavaScript objects, designed 
for human-readable data interchange across 
the Internet.
2  Caja is a technology to automatically convert 
JavaScript into a safe subset, based on the 
concepts of object-capability. The technol-
ogy is primarily used to run third-party 
JavaScript code within a sandbox.
3  JSONP is a method to request data from a 
cross-origin domain. It is primarily used as a 
browser-independent method to circumvent 
the same-origin policy.
